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Absolute Zero Energy Innovation Opportunities
UK demand for energy-intensive materials is growing, driving increased emissions in the UK and abroad. UK FIRES is a 
research programme sponsored by the UK Government, aiming to support a renaissance of UK Industry, compatible with 
our legal commitment to zero emissions by 2050 by placing Resource Eciency at the heart of the UK’s Future Industrial 
Strategy.
Industry is the most challenging sector for climate mitigation - it’s already energy ecient and there are no substitutes 
available at scale for the energy-intensive bulk materials - steel, cement, plastic, paper and aluminium. UK FIRES is 
therefore working towards an industrial renaissance in the UK, with high-value climate-safe UK businesses delivering 
goods and services compatible with the UK’s legal commitment to zero emissions and with much less new material 
production.
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Executive Summary
Our commitment to eliminate greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 calls for deep, systemic change in 
the way that we use energy and energy-intensive materials such as steel, aluminium and cement. 
Many technically viable options for change remain underexploited despite the ambitious climate 
change target set into UK law. This report explores why we continue to use excess energy and 
materials in the way that we construct buildings, manufacture cars and extract ores.
The nature of the challenge
By law, the UK is committed to eliminating all emissions 
by 2050. We are currently not on track to reach this target, 
which calls for radical change in the way that we meet 
the needs of our society. Even if the rapid expansion of 
renewable energy achieved in the UK over the last decade 
were to continue, and all currently available technology 
were applied to electrify processes and improve efficiency, 
we would still need to reduce demand for energy by 60% 
(Absolute Zero: www.ukfires.org/absolute-zero).
Options for change in key sectors
Despite the severity of the climate change target put into 
UK law, we continue to be wasteful in our use of key energy-
intensive materials. For example, we persist in designing 
cars that weigh significantly more than they need to and 
waste about a quarter of sheet metal unnecessarily in their 
production, and we persist in designing buildings that 
require 30% more steel than needed.
What is hampering change?
One way to think about change is as a balance between 
motivation and difficulty: change happens when 
motivation exceeds the difficulty of making the change. 
Change may not happen simply because incentives are 
inadequate. But even when change is desirable, it may still 
not be possible to enact quickly due to the configuration 
of existing supply chains and processes; we refer to this 
barrier to change as ‘lock-in’. Lock-in captures the idea that 
the potential for change in the future is to some extent 
predicated on what has happened in the past.
The nature of lock-in varies across industries; we consider 
examples in construction, automotive and mining. In the 
construction sector, designers tend to adapt previous 
building designs and use heuristics rather than explore 
the full range of  options available when designing new 
buildings.  Similarly, in the automotive sector, the car body 
architecture of a new model is often carried over from 
previous ones with the consequence that, despite the 
continual release of new models, cars remain locked-in to 
a particular design paradigm. Furthermore, in cases when 
more holistic car design changes are implemented, the 
implications for material demand, and hence emissions, 
are only calculated late in the design process after many 
key decisions have already been made. In contrast with 
automotive, the mining sector lacks the steady drum 
beat of new product launch and is notoriously cyclic. It 
is also more capital-intensive, co-dependencies between 
equipment suppliers and mining companies and long 
payback periods lead to a reticence to adopt novel, more 
efficient equipment.
From the detailed picture in specific industries, common 
lessons emerge: Three types of lock-in appear to hamper 
change:
Historical lock-in: when previous technology and design 
choices limit options to adapt to future needs.
Informational lock-in: when choices are under-informed 
either because of a lack of information or because of a 
surplus of information which is costly to analyse.
Coordination lock-in: when some players are less able to 
change because they suffer from other forms of lock-in or 
because they actively foster barriers to change to protect 
their competitive position.
Moving forward
Our climate change commitments call for deep, systemic 
change. The nature of lock-in within different industries 
reveals opportunities for change rooted in the intricacies 
of current decision-making processes and organisational 
structures. The first steps for managers seeking to 
overcome lock-in are to:
1. introduce different metrics into early stage decision 
processes, to raise awareness of opportunities;
2. introduce new people or resources into existing 
teams, to create a new focus on the carbon-saving 
opportunities;
3. expand the network of players involved in the 
activities surrounding the opportunities, in order to 
challenge embedded orthodoxies and to create a 
more dynamic exploration of alternatives.
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Coordination lock-in
Coordination lock-in happens when multiple stakeholders 
must work together to accomplish an objective. Lock-in 
occurs when one stakeholder is able to change, but other 
stakeholders in the system prevent them from doing so. 
This may be because other stakeholders are involuntarily 
constrained or because they deliberately resist change 
so as to protect their competitive position. The difficulty 
increases rapidly with the number of stakeholders 
involved.
Coordination lock-in is relevant to reconfiguring supply 
chains to improve resource efficiency. Examples include 
steel re-use in construction, where new relationships need 
to be established between actors in the value chain. It also 
applies in the capital-intensive mining industry, where co-
dependencies between equipment suppliers and mining 
companies can lead to a reluctance to adopt novel, more 
efficient equipment.
Historical lock-in
Historical lock-in happens when previous decisions 
limit future options, either directly, for example through 
financial investment in long-lived assets, or indirectly, 
for example through political capital being invested in 
decisions that are difficult to reverse.
The importance of historical lock-in depends on the 
timescale of the industry in question. Different industries 
have different timescales for the depreciation of capital 
assets and for design decisions. Airframes last for multiple 
decades, car platforms are redesigned every decade, and 
car models are refreshed every two years. Buildings are 
How does lock-in prevent change?
Key Message: ‘Lock-in’ captures the idea that the potential for change in the future is to some ex-
tent predicated on what has happened in the past. This could be due to the nature of relationships 
(coordination lock-in), due to historical practices and technology choices (historical lock-in), or due to 
the availability of information (informational lock-in). 
designed and constructed within the time horizon of the 
individual project.
Historical lock-in confounds the rapid decarbonisation 
of manufacturing and construction processes. As 
explained by the Material Economics report, Industrial 
Transformation 2050, key decisions made now risk locking 
in future choices. The report highlights that “EU companies 
will make important investment decisions in the next few 
years.1  Each will create a risk of lock-in (to high emission 
pathways) unless low-CO2 options are viable at these forks 
in the road”.
Informational lock-in
Informational lock-in happens when potential 
improvements are not implemented due to a lack of 
information or because of a surplus of information that 
is costly to analyse. Decision-makers may not be aware 
change is possible, they may not have enough evidence 
to make a change, or even if they do, they may not have 
the process in place to use the information. The bigger the 
gap between current operations and what is possible, the 
bigger the risk of this lock-in occurring.
Examples include the structural design of buildings where, 
due to time pressures and complexity, the optimum 
design is often not achieved (see the case study on 
building design). More generally, the Resources and Waste 
Strategy for England identified insufficient information 
as one of the key barriers to increasing the resource 
efficiency of businesses.2 This was especially the case for 
smaller businesses that often lack the resources needed 
for research.
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Case studies
The nature of lock-in will vary depending on many 
factors such as the nature of relationships within supply 
chains, the capital intensity of production, the intensity 
of competition, design practices and the structure of 
decision-making processes. In this report we explore six 
specific cases of lock-in, namely: reusing steel beams in 
buildings; building design optimisation; reducing wastage 
in car manufacturing; lightweighting vehicles; dry bulk 
sorting of ores; and, the shift away from diesel transport 
in mines.
Modelling the strength of lock-in 
We use a stylised model to gauge the difficulty associated 
with different transitions. Our method is derived from 
graph theory:  The current state and the desired future 
state, are represented by a set of block diagrams, be they 
of a production line in a factory or a supply chain involving 
many actors. The model allows these stylised diagrams to 
be modified in three ways (Figure 1):
1. adjust the capability of existing actors (option 1 on 
the left or option 2 on the right); 
2. add or remove actors (option 2 on the left or option 1 
on the right); 
3. reorganise the configuration. 
The model starts from a depiction of the current state and 
randomly modifies it (according to the rules above) until 
the desired state is reached. We interpret the number of 
random modifications required before the desired state is 
reached as an indicator of the difficulty of the transition. 
As a general rule, change is harder when there is a greater 
gap between the current state and the desired state, and 
when the target outcome is more specific.
Initial supply chain
Finished product
Coping with new capabilities
Finished product
Changing balance of demand
Finished product
Option 1 Option 2
Option 1
Option 2
Analysing lock-in
Key Message: The idea of lock-in emphasises that change is rooted in the intricacies of current deci-
sion-making processes, from which it follows that the nature of the lock-in needs to be analysed on a 
granular, case-specific basis. Nevertheless, common themes do emerge, and models can be used to 
help gauge the difficulty of transitions more generally. 
Figure 1: How supply changes can be reconfigured. The coloured bars represent operations or processes, and each box is a supplier or 
a team.
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Case Study 1: Steel Reuse
Reusing, instead of scrapping, steel sections from 
deconstructed buildings reduces emissions. There are 
many barriers to steel re-use, for example the certification 
of the steel or the perception that used elements are 
inferior to new ones.  Many strategies have been proposed 
to improve steel re-use, for example through streamlined 
certification processes and Building Information Models 
used to establish precise and up-to-date material 
Lock-in analysis for construction 
Key Message: In the construction sector, designers operate under high time pressure to design 
one-of-a-kind buildings. They tend to adapt designs for similar buildings rather than explore the 
full scope of design options available to them. This locks in inefficient design.  At the end of the 
building’s life, steel sections that could be re-used are routinely recycled at an unnecessary energy 
premium. Optimisation software and specialist contractors can help to overcome obstacles to 
change in the sector.
Figure 1: Modelling options for re-use of steel beams in building construction
availability databases. Currently, however, only 5% of 
construction steel in the UK is re-used, despite most of it 
being in the form of standard beams and columns which 
could be re-used after minor reconditioning3.
Modelling the process change 
In Figure 1, we compare two scenarios that depart from the 
usual sequence:  Steel component manufacture - Building 
fabrication - Building demolition.
Mill
New links
Recondition 
specialist
Elements
Building
Usual links 1a. Introducing a new actor
Used          
Elements
Usual actors
New actors
Mill
Elements
Building
Elements
Used
Elements
Used
Elements
Condition
Procure
Erect
Procure used
Demolish
One reused beam:
Introducing a new actor
Coordinating reuse
Fabricator
Demolition
contractor
Fabricator
Stockist
Demolition
contractor
Stockist
1b. Coordinating reuse
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a. Introducing a new actor:  A reconditioning 
specialist is introduced to the processes to supply the 
existing stockist. They collect used sections and recondition 
the beams so that they can be sold on ‘as new’.
b. Coordinating re-use:  The fabricators must get 
sections from the demolition contractors and, when the 
necessary sections are unavailable, procure as they would 
normally from the stockist. The sections procured from 
the demolition contractors must be reconditioned before 
being fabricated to the required specifications.
Reconditioning requires the same skills and equipment 
as needed for fabrication of beams. Certification of the 
fabrication follows the same process. Certifying the steel 
itself is not currently possible because CE marking on 
steel beams can only be done by foundries. The physical 
properties guaranteed by the certificate can be verified 
through testing, and an equivalent - but not standard - 
certificate can be provided.3
Figure 1 illustrates how the supply chain is modelled 
using block diagrams for this analysis. The ‘introducing a 
new actor’ flow chart shows the process change required 
if a reconditioning specialist is introduced, whereas the 
‘coordinating re-use’ diagram shows the flow for steel 
re-use directly from the demolition contractor. Coloured 
blocks mark the operations each actor performs. Arrows 
indicate the connections between the actors as the beams 
are produced, fabricated, erected, and removed after 
demolition. The circles on the arrow indicate the material 
or semi-finished product being passed along.
A specialised ‘procure used beams’ operation has been 
added to the ‘new actor’ scenario. In this case the bulk 
procurement of used beams is a specialist task which 
requires knowledge of demolition activities across the 
region of supply. Instead, in the ‘Coordinating re-use’ 
scenario used beams are procured from a known source as 
a one-off. Usually this will not fully cover the needs of the 
new build, and the shortfall will be supplied by the stockist.
This example is a practical case of ‘thinking outside the 
box’ where instead of relying only on known partners, the 
solution lies in finding new ones, responsible for doing 
what appeared to be a core business operation. Managers 
looking for material efficiency options should approach 
the problem hollistically: opportunities often lie in new 
business networks and operations, as well as improved 
products.
The model suggests that the new actor scenario is better in 
almost all cases (Figure 2). 
The lock: Re-certification is tightly regulated; supply of 
used beams is intermittent with low visibility 
A solution: Introduce a new actor, a company that 
specialises in sale, aggregation and re-certification of used 
beams
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Case study 2: Building design 
optimisation
Almost every building, particularly a larger commercial 
building, is ‘one of a kind’, every site is slightly different, 
with likely different requirements in terms of foundations, 
wind loads and exposure. To guarantee the safety of 
structures, the design of buildings follows rules or ‘building 
codes’ which are extremely detailed. Furthermore, the 
design of buildings occurs under considerable time 
pressure. Simple buildings with all structural parameters 
fixed can be built according to the code in tens, or even 
hundreds, of ways. With so many design options available, 
informational lock-in can occur making it too difficult for a 
designer to optimise for lower embodied emissions: rather 
than optimising each new building, previous designs are 
adapted.
A technological solution for this type of informational 
lock-in is a computer modelling tool which translates the 
building codes and specific site parameters into large 
numbers of preliminary designs. An example of the results 
of such a tool is shown in Figure 3, these possible solutions 
can help the designer to make better informed decisions 
at the outset of the design process by revealing material 
efficiency trade-offs. By allowing designers to quickly 
analyse all options available relative to the particular 
constraints of the project, the tool helps designers to find 
tailored, optimised solutions and avoids overspecification 
caused by adapting designs from similar buildings. 
Figure 3: Example results from building design optimisation software every dot is a different layout and decking combination. The 
graph shows the carbon cost trade-offs for different designs for the same building. 
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Modelling the process change 
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of such a tool on the map of 
possible changes.  The tool only affects the capabilities of 
the existing actors - there is no block diagram equivalent 
to Figure 1. It reduces lock-in mostly by opening up many 
options. Companies wanting to prevent informational 
lock-in need to take action to make sure they keep 
their technological edge, including for example, R&D 
programmes to develop new tools, and design exercises 
to increase the portfolio of options for meeting real 
demands.
Building new design tools is a difficult task, frequently 
outside the in-house expertise. Nonetheless, this strategy, 
widely applicable across sectors, can hold great promise. 
Crucially, the process of building the tool requires a 
detailed specification of the design process, a valuable 
exercise which has the potential on its own to help 
overcome lock-in. In the face of large disruption caused 
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Figure 4: Mapping the probability of success (indicated by lighter areas) for optimising embodied emissions in building design. The 
arrow demonstrates the effect of introducing new optimisation software to the scenarios modelled. In each case, change is more 
likely to be successful with the new software introduced: the area of yellow lying under the line is larger, marking more, successful 
transitions.
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by abrupt changes in legislation or consumer demands, 
being flexible is key. Being flexible means having more 
options – fortunately, looking for these options is a good 
way to grow businesses in any situation! Looking forward, 
managers should think about the potential of R&D not only 
as a source of future revenue streams, but as a safeguard 
against disruption.
The lock: The design process is highly codified. Companies 
and individuals are penalised if they depart from the 
codes. There is neither budget, nor time, to undertake 
whole system design. Instead, it is common practice to 
reuse large elements of earlier designs
A solution: Use of computer models to allow design options 
to be identified and evaluated quickly - from system-level 
to component-level
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Lock-in Analysis for the transport sector 
Key Message: The transportation sector, especially the car industry, is undergoing a number of 
significant shifts. The industry is moving towards electric drivetrains and lighter aluminium bodies 
whilst facing decreasing consumer demand and ever more stringent environmental regulations. 
Despite a highly complex design process, much of the car body architecture in new models is carried 
over from previous models. Consequently, despite the continual release of new models, cars remain 
locked-in to a particular design paradigm. Even when more holistic car design changes are imple-
mented, the material demand implications of novel designs are only calculated late in the design 
process after many key decisions have already been made.
Case Study 1: Material utilisation
Sheet metal utilisation in car body structures is estimated 
at a disappointing 56% globally.4 The range in utilisation 
from its best, at 70%, to worst, at just 39%, is striking. 
Improving material utilisation in car-making is constrained 
by the nature of the car design process.
Tier One car manufacturers create multi-model ‘platform 
designs’ that form the basis for different models of vehicles 
produced by automotive OEMs (Figure 5). Thus, much of 
the body architecture, systems and components are carried 
over from previous models, or held in common with the 
OEM’s other brands. As a result, cars are highly optimised, 
and yet also locked-in to particular design paradigms. 
The Use Less Group carried out a 2018 study with Jaguar 
Land Rover, on implementing improved material efficiency 
in practice.5 A cross-functional team was set up with the 
Platform level design
Manufacturing trials
Component manufacture
Vehicle level design
Initial component design 
Detailed component design 
Initial manufacturing design
Detailed manufacturing design
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Figure 6: Typical structure of product design activities in the automotive industry
Image: Car body structure Figure 5: Car body structure b. Industry-reported material 
utilisation by vehicle classification type 
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savings are possible. Early consideration requires better 
cross-functional collaboration and/or tools to show how 
design changes impact manufacturing processing waste. 
This is especially important when components are shared 
between models and vehicles across a design platform: 
there might be only one chance to make the best decision 
for resource efficiency for the next decade or more. 
The lock: Wide-scale use of platform design principles; use 
of a sequential design process
A solution: adopt a holistic design process and use of 
cross-functional teams
scope to make changes to five components as part of a 
model year refresh. A vehicle with an initial material 
utilisation of about 50% was chosen for the analysis.
For each component, the team analysed the stages of 
early component design, detailed component design and 
then early and detailed manufacturing process design. 
This process identified opportunities to improve material 
efficiency by 24%, estimated to save £9 million and 5 
ktonnes of CO2 annually, most of which came from early 
component design. This is about the same as the gap 
between the vehicle’s current utilisation, and known best 
practice.
However, the timing of the study coincided with detailed 
manufacturing process design, and it was only possible 
to implement 3% of the improvements available. This 
highlights the lock-in that automotive manufacturers face: 
At the point when material utilisation is known with the 
most certainty (detailed manufacturing design), most 
design decisions have already been cast, and it is very 
difficult to make significant improvements.
There is a clear message:  Consider material utilisation much 
earlier in the product development cycle when considerable 
Figure 7: Material saving opportunities identified (blue and grey) and implemented (green) for five components, organised by design 
stage
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Case study 2: Weight reduction by 
material substitution or downsizing
Reducing the weight of cars is a key strategy to achieve 
the climate change targets set into UK law. Weight 
reduction can be achieved by substituting some of the 
materials used in car manufacturing with lighter ones, and 
by reducing the size of cars. Of the two, size reduction has 
the largest effect on life cycle emissions, however, there 
are currently no incentives to manufacturers producing 
smaller cars. Consumers prefer bigger cars due to higher 
perceived safety, and manufacturers receive most of their 
profits from larger car classes. For this reason, the current 
motivations in the automotive sector are a barrier for 
change. 
Here we model two configuration changes shown in 
Figure 8:
a. Changing material sourcing to reduce car weight by 
replacing mild steel with lighter wrought aluminium. 
This may require reconfiguration of supply chains so 
as to provide more wrought aluminum and less mild 
steel. 
b. Changing both material sourcing and demand. 
Car clubs could act as an intermediary stakeholder 
between manufacturers and car users to help the 
8a. Changing material sourcing with current demandUsual links
Reduced links
New links
Usual actors
New actors
8b. Changing material sourcing with reduced demand / alternate distribution
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Car production / 
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Same distribution
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new distribution
manufacturers and consumers to produce and use 
smaller cars. Car clubs would sell car-use services 
to consumers instead of car ownership. This would 
reduce demand for cars, thus potentially making the 
lightweight transition easier.
Figure 9 shows estimates of how difficult it would be to 
implement the process changes based upon our model.
Figure 8: Block diagrams for the process change in the autonomies supply chain
Figure 9: Probability of success of implementation of the two 
process changes represented in Figure 8
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The results of Figure 9 show that although both 
configurations have similar average difficulties of 
implementation, the introduction of car clubs may create 
additional complexities. Introducing a new stakeholder 
in the supply chain creates more disruption in the 
relationship between car manufacturers and users, and 
this is shown by the long tail of very hard transitions in the 
top graph of Figure 9. This shows how difficult it is to break 
the current feedback loop between car manufacturers and 
consumers that generates no incentives to produce and 
use smaller cars.
Lightweighting by material substitution leads to a 
moderate reduction in average car weight and operational 
energy uses. Manufacturers have already started 
implementing this transition over the past decade. 
However, the necessary reduction of future energy use 
in transport will require reducing car size. The model 
suggests that there are significant structural barriers to 
implementing this strategy.
This example looks at an industry as a whole, and 
modelling suggest transitions will be difficult in many 
cases. But this doesn’t mean that all transitions or changes 
will be difficult. Companies best prepared for the changes 
ahead will thrive as their competition falls behind.
The lock: Larger vehicles are perceived by consumers as 
being safer than smaller vehicles, and sell for higher profits.
A solution: The status quo is hard to shift because 
of close alignment of the motivations of consumers 
and manufacturers.  Car sharing is unlikely to lead to 
much change in vehicle sizes.  A possible unlock is for 
governments to incentivise manufacturers to make, and 
consumers to buy, smaller cars, e.g. through taxes and 
subsidies.
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Lock-in Analysis for Mining
Key Message: The mining sector is locked-in developing larger and larger operations, and thus 
finds it more and more difficult to change any aspect of its operations. Co-dependencies between 
equipment suppliers and mining companies and long payback periods lead to a reluctance to adopt 
novel, more efficient equipment. Vertical integration can reduce lock-in arising from inflexibility of 
current suppliers - new technologies which improve resource efficiency can alleviate scaling issues.
Mining and quarrying are the main source of today’s 
materials, and expected to remain so up to and beyond 
2050, although during this period, the mix of demand is 
likely to change. Worldwide, these activities currently 
account for 0.5% of primary energy supply.6
Mines are constrained by several factors, resulting in 
locked-in modes of operation. Mines are typically very 
large and new mines are getting bigger. For example, the 
mean size of copper mines has increased by 182% between 
1976 to 2000, driven by a reduction in the concentration 
of new ore reserves.7 It is difficult to start a mine small and 
get bigger in size: Once a mine layout has been decided, 
access routes constrain the size of equipment that can 
be used; this inflexibility inevitably makes it difficult to 
achieve optimal efficiency. Mines require large investment 
of financial capital, often well over $1bn, and decisions 
to invest typically assume operation for at least 15 years. 
As a result, choices are made up front to use proven and 
recognised technology, minimising risk but potentially 
locking in sub-optimal resource efficiency.
200019951990198519801975
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
A
nn
ua
l m
et
al
 c
ap
ac
ity
('0
00
 tp
a 
Cu
)
Based on mine numbers. All mines
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
1862 1872 1882 1892 1902 1912 1922 1932 1942 1952 1962 1972 1982 1992 2002
 A
ve
ra
ge
 %
 g
ra
de
 o
f c
op
pe
r o
re
 tr
ea
te
d 
in
 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
Calumet & Hecla, Michigan
US Average
Quincy, Michigan
Operating at such large scale, mining firms build up co-
dependencies that lock in ways of working. For instance, 
there are few suppliers of industrial mining equipment, 
which limits options for change. Mines are typically the 
dominant source of economic activity in their local areas, 
so both changes to working practices or starting up new 
sites are highly sensitive issues.
The two biggest users of energy in mining are grinding 
and heavy mobile equipment. We present a case study for 
an innovation related to each.
Figure 11: ...whilst ore concentrations are reducing.
Figure 10: Copper mine sizes are getting bigger.
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Case Study 1: Dry bulk sorting
In mining, as much as 40% of the energy is used for grinding 
rocks into particles of sizes below 100µm, allowing the 
resource to be separated from the fines.8 Usually, the mine 
is divided into small regions, and in each, the average 
concentration of resource is determined; and a decision is 
taken to reject it or go ahead with grinding.
Dry bulk sorting is a technology for scanning the output 
material from the first stage of crushing and then 
discarding batches with weaker concentration. This means 
that the resource efficiency of the subsequent grinding 
can be significantly improved since the input material is 
of higher concentration, outweighing the extra energy for 
crushing of possibly sub-par ore. For a typical copper mine, 
crushing and grinding resource efficiency can improve by 
about 15%.9
Introduction of any new equipment involves staff training 
in operating and maintenance procedures. However, the 
introduction faces no fundamental blocks. In return, dry 
bulk sorting enables favourable changes to the criteria for 
selecting regions for extraction, and to the criteria for mine 
abandonment.  The effects could be far-reaching:  enabling 
profitability at smaller scale by a more gradual ramp-up of 
operations, and making a larger range of sites profitable. 
The lock: the industry (investors, suppliers and mining 
companies) are locked into a paradigm that profitability is 
only achieved through increasing economies of scale
A solution: Dry bulk sorting allows selection of ore of 
higher value for subsequent processing. It allows the 
mine to become profitable sooner, and at smaller scale, 
transforming the investment cycle
Case Study 2: Trucks shift from diesel
Up to 20% of the energy associated with open-pit mining – 
the most ubiquitous form of resource extraction - is spent 
powering heavy mobile equipment, with diesel.9 These 
trucks are often very large, with engine sizes exceeding 
1MW. Eliminating these emissions requires breaking 
out of existing practices, up and down the supply chain. 
One solution is being trialed at Mogolakwena mine, near 
Mokopane, South Africa. It is projected to be cost positive 
in the long-run, but highlights the extent of lock-in that 
must be overcome.
The trucks to be converted are 290 tonne payload diesel-
electric trucks supplied by a major equipment provider. 
They have a 2MW diesel electric generator, sized to power 
the fully-loaded truck as it lifts ores up the steep slopes 
of the mine, but also to supply power to several ancillary 
systems. Diesel is transported to site by commercial 
tankers.  This system is shown in Figure 11.
The new trucks are fuelled by green hydrogen generated 
by the electrolysis of water using an off-grid solar system. 
On-board, a 0.8 MW hydrogen fuel cell provides power 
and charges 1 MWh batteries, topped up by regenerative 
braking – see Figure 12. A demonstration truck was reverse 
engineered from an existing one, stripped of its diesel 
engine, by a specialist systems engineering firm.
Anglo-American, a mining company, had to integrate 
both energy supply and equipment design into its own 
operations, highlighting the lengths the company had to 
go to  overcome lock-in to its existing supply arrangements. 
The lessons learnt from overcoming this lock-in may help 
the business become more agile.
The lock: Equipment manufacturers, maintenance and 
operations teams are locked into the paradigm of using 
diesel fuel
A solution: Work with a third party to create a tangible 
demonstrator so as to increase the confidence of 
incumbents
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Figure 12: New supply arrangements for shifting away from 
diesel mining trucks
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Lessons about Unlock
Historical Lock-in
Key Points: A valuable design exercise to avoid 
historical lock-in is to imagine production 
routes from a blank slate. Although such routes 
may never be implemented, they provide 
a lens through which to see possible future 
constraints, which may otherwise be hidden. 
 
Avoiding historical lock-in is not easy as the future is 
unknown. Nonetheless, at relatively short time horizons, 
10-15 years, it is generally possible to extrapolate from 
current trends and, over longer time horizons, to use 
scenario planning to explore different potential futures 
and to allow for non-linear change.  This, however, requires 
a team of in-house experts responsible for tracking their 
developments across their industry, and mapping them to 
the future. 
Another view of historical lock-in is the cost of the 
evolution of design and/or tools over multiple generations. 
Every time a design is changed, or new tooling introduced 
to the production line, or new subcontractors brought 
into the supply chain, the incentives to make use of these 
specific capabilities in future iterations of the product will 
grow. This is a special case of the sunk cost fallacy:  It is 
of course cost efficient to make use of readily available 
capacities, but this may prevent better designs from being 
chosen or close off whole avenues of development if some 
capabilities become central to the identity of a firm.
Informational Lock-in
Key Points: Design cycles can be very short, 
with little time to investigate all the possible 
options. Optimisation tools can be developed 
and used to process information and explore 
the design space more fully.  Even if the 
recommended solutions cannot be fully 
implemented, they can be used to inform 
a path of iterative change towards better 
solutions.
Informational lock-in is due to not being aware that changes 
are possible. This can arise from short development cycles, 
entrenched habits in the design of products, or insufficient 
awareness of new technological developments. It is 
particularly difficult to break out of this type of lock-in 
because it does not make itself apparent. It is further 
entrenched by the tendency of firms to recruit people with 
similar profiles to their existing staff; the resultant lack of 
diversity can create organisational blindness that locks 
designs into local optima.
To avoid informational lock-in, firms can devote part of 
their resources to research and development, but require, 
as part of the research process, regular reviews of the state-
of-the-art as well as exploratory studies. The results of 
these reviews should then be communicated widely within 
the companies so that new good practices can spread. 
Because many of these changes will not be possible at any 
specific point of the product cycle, dedicated teams must 
take them up, and design integration strategies over future 
cycles. Continuous research towards globally efficient 
solutions should be encouraged. Not with the objective of 
implementing them, but to chart paths towards them. This 
can further help avoid future historical lock-in.
Informational lock-in may not be caused by a lack of 
knowledge, but rather a lack of process or cultural factors 
that would support use of that knowledge. For example, a 
structural engineer may be capable of designing a better 
structure, but the number of possible options is large, and 
therefore it is impossible for the engineer to improve the 
structure in the time available. To break out of this type 
of lock-in requires new types of tools or fundamental 
rethinking of the design cycle.
Construction gives a good example: Every building is 
different, if only because its site differs, and so the design 
of each one is unique. Designing a very complex product 
in a short time frame is the specialty of the construction 
industry, and this is done through extensive use of heuristic 
approaches and re-use of previous designs. Consequently, 
it is very uncommon that any building will be highly 
optimised for the purpose of lower embodied carbon, 
even though lighter buildings are universally understood 
as being better from an engineering standpoint.
A technological solution is the use of a computer 
modelling tool to generate large numbers of preliminary 
(‘scheme’) designs which help the project team make 
the right decisions early in the design process, and show 
material efficiency trade-offs that would otherwise remain 
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hidden. Materials make up a large fraction of the cost of 
the frame of a building, and nearly 4% of the overall project 
cost. Consequently, material saving can easily offset any 
supplementary engineering cost.
Use of scheme designs is more applicable to industries in 
which the processes are fairly standardised, and there are 
well-understood rules for the design. In such instances, 
the modelling tool reveals the complete set of options 
which match the prescribed rules with enough detail that 
the generated solutions can be used as starting points for 
designers. Use of scheme designs is at its most effective 
when a new platform is required. Their use avoids the trap 
of evolutionary change, wherein - possibly unintentionally 
- much of the previous product platform might be kept.
Coordination lock-in
Key points: Coordination is critical to 
effecting change but can only occur when 
there is mutual trust and cooperation within 
existing supply chains. Technology roadmaps 
can help to build a shared vision for future 
developments. Vertical integration can help 
to align interests with suppliers. If significant 
change is blocked by existing players then 
it may come from outside players, causing 
greater disruption.
Coordination is a critical issue in effecting change. It 
requires multiple actors with possibly diverging objectives 
to work together in a timely fashion to accomplish an 
objective. The potential for change within supply chains 
is constrained by existing power structures. Actors may 
oppose change that is not in their interest however, if they 
persist in blocking change they may become susceptible 
to disruptive change from new entrants. 
Within a sector, publishing roadmaps can help. For 
example, in semiconductors, the performance goals of 
major manufacturers are known years in advance, and 
therefore devices can be designed assuming future 
products that only exist virtually. These roadmaps also 
drive all the supply chains to improve their products to 
match the future requirements.
Coordination problems also suffer from a scale barrier. The 
number of interactions which needs to be solved grows 
to the square of the number of actors needed to effect 
the change. Therefore, if for three actors to coordinate, 
three relationships need to be established, this number 
grows to 12 with four actors and 20 with 5. When any 
failed relationship can sink a project, large-scale changes 
which are not slowly phased in have a lower probability of 
success.
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APPENDIX
Modelling change
The following figures attempt to map the difficulty of 
changing between two organisations. The vertical axis is 
used to locate the current situation, and the horizontal one 
the expected situation after the change. These maps can 
give a sense of what type of changes, or what combination 
of factors may lead to more difficult situations.
To generalise the lessons from each case study, we have 
abstracted the difficulty to change a production set-up 
to a number of simple factors: the number of actors in 
the chain and the over-capacity of the actors. Further, we 
looked at two important circumstances: whether, or not, 
the tools or suppliers can change their production process.
For example: The construction industry falls far behind 
the performance that it could achieve by deployment of 
state-of-the-art practices and technologies; it has high 
over-capacity. Counter-intuitively, an industry closer to 
the state-of-the-art tends to find change easier:  the areas 
where the capacity stays the same or grows are lighter, 
indicating easier change.
 
 
The model
The manufacture of a product is modelled as the sequential 
addition of ‘ingredients’. When the sum total of provided 
ingredients matches or exceeds the requirements of the 
product, the supply chain ‘works’.
Working supply chains are then subject to a shock: the 
requirements for the product change, either because a 
completely new ingredient is required, or the balance of 
ingredients changes, or the amount of input is modified. 
The model then looks to find a new ‘working’ chain by 
increasing the capacity of the existing actors, adding new 
actors and reorganising the chain. It does this randomly, 
and the number of attempts is recorded. The more 
attempts needed to find a new working solution, the 
greater the difficulty of the transition.
The landscape of lock-in
We created a set of synthetic problems to represent the 
large number of possible transitions in response to shocks 
in the supply chain. We then modelled ease of transition in 
response to these problems. Figure 13 shows results with 
the dark zones representing difficult transitions and the 
light ones easier.
If the suggested process change maps onto darker areas of 
the graph, then there is a high risk that the change will be 
confounded by lock-in.
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Figure 13: The graphs were created by considering the millions of possible transitions in response to a shock in the supply chain; 
each graph is for a particular type of shock, shown in the title. On the vertical axis is the capacity before the transition, and on 
the horizontal, after. The colour shade indicates the difficulty of the transition, darker is harder. Zones with few points are where 
very few successful transitions occurred. The y=x line marks transitions where there was no change in the production set-up, i.e. no 
additional capacity.
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